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BATTLE AMONG THE BRANCHES: THE TWO
HUNDRED YEAR WAR
STANLEY M. BRANDt
Perhaps the most pervasive and well-known doctrine of American constitu-
tional law is the so-called separation of powers. American school children learn
at an early age the division of our government into three great departments. If
there is one concept for which our constitutional system is known in other coun-
tries, and which distinguishes it from other constitutional or parliamentary de-
mocracies, it is the "checks and balances" which reinforce the concept of
separation of powers-indeed it produces intentional "inevitable friction"'
among the branches from which flows sober and balanced decisionmaking. In-
deed, the experience of the Framers led them to seek mechanisms that would
limit or control sources of governmental power and abuse and the separation of
powers is the reflection of the deeply held belief that where the people censor the
government, power must be diffuse "the better to secure liberty."
'2
The separation of powers cannot be found in so many words in the Consti-
tution; rather, as Professors Miller and Knapp have remarked, it is more a polit-
ical theory concerning a system of allocated governmental powers that emanates
from both the parts and the whole of the document. 3 The conventional wisdom
often mistakenly overemphasizes the "separation" element of the doctrine; in
truth the safeguards against abusive government action so brilliantly crafted in
1787 result from the "partial agency," as Madison put it in Federalist No. 46,
4
which the branches have in each other that reinforces, indeed, forms the essence
of the doctrine.
It seems apt in this bicentennial year to closely examine this central doc-
trine and see how it has worked and whether it still serves the important pur-
poses intended by the Framers. Unlike so many more localized constitutional
doctrines-concepts neatly housed in a section, clause, or even amendment to
the Constitution-the separation of powers spills over and runs throughout and
could not be easily modified without rendering askew interrelated parts, and
thereby the whole. My examination today, therefore, will focus more on the
developments of the doctrine in our time and how they have effected shifts in
power among the branches and what likely lies ahead. Our view of the constitu-
tional separation of powers often reflects shifts in our political institutions as
t Partner at Brand & Lowell, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1970, Franklin & Marshall College;
J.D. 1974, Georgetown University.
1. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 93 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
3. Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving The Constitutional Framework, 52
IND. L.J. 367, 384-85 (1977).
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 336 (J. Madison) (Dawson ed. 1865).
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well which, in my view, is appropriate given the Framers' reliance on a popu-
larly elected legislature, and less frequently elected President, as the primary
residuums of what I would call active constitutional power. Trends in separa-
tion of powers, unlike many other areas of constitutional interpretation, are not
confined to Court watching and reviews of the terms of the Supreme Court, for
as the Court itself has remarked, each branch is initially required to evaluate
issues of constitutionality incident to the performance of its assigned duties;5
indeed, some separation of powers confrontations of the greatest and most last-
ing proportions, like rejected or failed judicial nominations or claims of execu-
tive privilege with which I am most familiar, 6 never reach the courts.
The post-Watergate period has seen some of the most dramatic shifts in
separation of powers; it is not an exaggeration to suggest that more has hap-
pened on the separation of powers front in the nearly thirteen year period since
the Nixon tapes case than in the previous seventy-five years of constitutional
law. Indeed, in two recent terms the Court made more far-reaching separation
of powers law in the Chadha (legislative veto)7 and Bowsher (constitutionality of
Gramm-Rudman) 8 cases than any time since Myers9 and Humphrey's Execu-
tor.10 Only eight years ago, the Court paused long before declining to decide
whether the President may terminate a treaty under the Constitution without
congressional approval. In declining judicial intervention in what it termed a
"Legislative and Executive dispute," four concurring Justices explained the ra-
tionale for abstaining: "we are asked to settle a dispute between coequal
branches of our Government, each of which has resources available to protect
and assert its interests, resources not available to private litigants outside the
judicial forum."11
One other Justice concurring explained that prudential concerns counseled
hesitation "until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional au-
thority. Differences between the President and the Congress are commonplace
under our system." 12
In the area of presidential congressional war making powers, Congress
passed and Presidents have both resisted and bent to the War Powers Resolu-
tion. 13 The President has, in this same period, in an unprecedented and high
handed fashion, instructed officers of the government to ignore a law duly passed
by Congress, which he signed into law, before any court had construed its con-
5. See Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
6. See Brand & Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving a Prompt and Orderly
Means By Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands Against Executive Branch Officials,
36 CATH. U.L. REv. 71 (1986).
7. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
8. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
9. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
10. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
11. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004 (1979) (mem.) (Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, Stewart,
and Stevens, J.J., concurring).
12. Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
13. See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (Supp. 1987)).
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stitutionality. 14 In advising agencies to ignore provisions of the Competition-in-
Contracting Act which he signed into law, the President added a new chapter to
the already overblown claims made under the Take Care Clause to ignore the
duty to uphold the laws which that provision imposes on the President. And the
courts have entered new fields of political questions where previously judges
feared to tread, asserting jurisdiction over suits involving congressional commit-
tee ratios, 15 House and Senate chaplains 16 and blithely ignoring the standing
doctrine to reach interbranch issues previously thought to be nonjusticiable. 17
The separation of powers has also, on occasion, been the refuge, or battle cry, for
scurrilous and ill-founded legal attacks by the branches on one another. Noth-
ing exposes more quickly the weakness of a coordinate branch's legal position in
a constitutional confrontation than the filiopietistic incantation of "separation of
powers" concerns without explicit and precise textual support. Despite the fact
that the separation of powers is a structural doctrine, as opposed to a purely
localized textually based notion, one must begin any separation analysis with
reference to the specific textual provisions which are at issue. Generalized
claims of separation of powers conflicts are suspect and as the Court has defined
the test in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services: "in determining whether
[an Act of Congress] disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate
branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the exec-
utive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." 18 Too
often, separation of powers concerns are not undergirded by specific textual
provisions.
The 200 Year War between the branches has, in my view, in this decade
become more strident, even shrill, in tone and substance. And, often in the lat-
est skirmishes, the casual observer cannot tell the players without a scorecard.
For example, the recent modus operandi of the executive branch, acting through
the Department of Justice, has been to refuse to defend duly enacted laws of the
sovereign which are not to its constitutional liking and to rely on the Congress to
defend statutes under attack by litigants. 19 I do not want to suggest that the
doctrine is subject to pure empirical analysis, but to give you an idea of the rapid
escalation of executive branch legal defaults, between 1787 and 1974 the execu-
tive branch failed to defend only four times.20 Since 1974, it has failed to de-
fend, or attacked, congressional enactments or actions seven times-almost
14. H.R. REP. No. 99-138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
15. Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
16. Murray v. Morton, 505 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1981) appeal dismissed and judgment vacated
sub. nom, Murray v. Buchanan, 720 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc), vacating, 674 F.2d 14
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
17. See Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 577 & n.9 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (en banc).
18. 433 U.S. 424, 443 (1977).
19. E.g., Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 888-889 (3d
Cir. 1986).
20. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926); Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc); Simkins v. Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
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twice as many times as during the first 187 years of the Republic. 2 1 This failure
to defend skews traditional notions of adverseness and puts the Legislature in
the uncomfortable position of becoming a party litigant. What confuses the cas-
ual observer is that despite abandoning its role of defender of the laws of the
United States under a perverse reading of the Take Care Clause, 22 it nevertheless
lays claim to the mantle "United States." The Court has tolerated, even com-
pounded this perversion, by holding that the Congress, merely speaking by court
invitation as a non-party amicus curiae, can supply the adverseness necessary to
decide a case or controversy,23 a revolutionary concept in our jurisprudence.
The Congress is not without culpability in creating confusion and uncertainty in
this realm, because while professing to disapprove of the practice, it has passed
statutes inviting, even seemingly authorizing, the courts to decide cases without
a hard look at case or controversy requirements of standing, adverseness, and
ripeness. 24 In the Gramm-Rudman statute itself, the Congress enacted a provi-
sion which on its face purported to confer standing on individual Congressmen
to sue to litigate the constitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction
law.25
The issue of which branch is entitled to the mantle of the United States is
more than a matter of trivial nomenclature: it reveals deep-seated and funda-
mental views about the proper role of each branch. Of course, each branch as
part of "the government" is entitled to the label, and acts as the United States
when it discharges its prescribed duties; conversely, when it eschews acting on
behalf "of the government as a whole" it may not come into court as the United
States absent a statutory authorization to sue and an articulated injury to an
interest of the federal government as a whole. When the Attorney General seeks
to assert the interest of the President in defending his view of the Constitution,
the "United States" is not present, only one branch is. If the United States has
independent standing, it is not through the Executive when that branch defaults
on its "take care" obligation.
When the Department of Justice brought an unprecedented and ill-fated
suit against the House of Representatives to enjoin and declare illegal a House
contempt citation against the EPA administrator for refusal to produce docu-
ments, it presumptuously and with no statutory authority sued in the name of
the United States.26
21. See Synar v. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983);
Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986); Deaver v.
Seymour, Civ. Action No. 87-0477 (D.D.C. 1987); United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F.
Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983); Pacific Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981); League
of Women Voters v. FCC, 489 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Calif. 1980).
22. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
23. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 939.
24. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 47a(e)(1)(A) (1982) ("any interested person (including a consumer or
consumer organization)" may file a petition for judicial review of an FTC rule).
25. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
§ 274(a)(1)(3), 99 Stat. 1037, 1099 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 922 (Supp. 1987)).
26. See United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
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In Clark v. Valeo,27 a suit involving the constitutionality of the federal elec-
tion law, the Department sought to litigate the interest of the President in his
prerogatives and on behalf of the United States as well. And as in Clark, during
the Department's conduct of a declaratory suit challenging the congressional
contempt of the Administrator of EPA, it sought to litigate the issue of Presi-
dential privilege in the name of the United States.28
Most recently, the Department of Justice refused to defend the constitution-
ality of the appointment of independent counsel under the Ethics-in-Govern-
ment Act in challenges brought by Oliver North and Michael Deaver. Under
the newly encouraged regime of judicial laxity on what the Court has repeatedly
stated are bedrock constitutional requirements for the exercise of judicial
power, 29 it falls to the legislative branch, not the Executive, to defend the
statute.
The contradiction in stating, as the Department has, that the purely execu-
tive function to enforce the law, and by implication the duty to conduct litiga-
tion arising from enforcement, 30 on the one hand renders judicial appointment
of independent counsels suspect, and on the other hand to refuse to defend litiga-
tion brought to determine constitutionality seems both apparent and consum-
mately arrogant. What the executive seeks is arrogation of all power in itself to
determine constitutionality.
If the Executive can instruct agencies to ignore duly enacted law prior to
judicial review, as it did in the Competition-in-Contracting Act, and also refuse
to defend at the point a genuine case or controversy arises, then it obliterates pro
tanto the legislative and judicial function in one fell swoop-precisely what
Madison decried in Federalist No. 46 when he warned against the "accumula-
tion of all powers, Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, in the same hands
...."31 These separation of powers dramas are not fully played out yet and so it
is too early to tell how they will affect the balance of power.
As we learned, perhaps too painfully in the Watergate episode, the most
strident constitutional arguments, however well-founded, can founder and sink
when the institution asserting them is weakened and badly perceived by the
public.
These Executive positions have brought equally strident legislative re-
sponses and so far the courts have provided little comfort to the Executive
position.
As one who participated along with Professor Gene Gressman in the new
posture of the legislature as litigant in the post-Watergate era, I have neverthe-
27. 559 F.2d 642, 653-57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., Tamm, Wright, J.J.,
concurring).
28. See United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
29. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
30. Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Separation of Powers of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1976)
(litigation is basically an executive function) (statement of Assistant Attorney General Rex Lee).
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 3, at 334.
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less questioned the strategic value, if not the wisdom, of depositing these contro-
versies upon the judicial doorstep. In view of the vast legislative power to rein in
the Executive through constitutional, but non-justiciable means, Congress would
be wise to use these armaments to block actions of the Executive it deems uncon-
stitutional. Executive power is itself, with the sole exception of the Presidency
and Vice-Presidency, a creation of Congress. The "vast array of departments
which the President oversees" are but "creatures of the Congress" and indeed
"owe their very existence to the Legislative Branch."'32 For example, the best
means for Congress to enforce document demands met with claims of Executive
privilege may be to withhold exercise of its legislative power. During the recent
controversy involving the Department's refusal to divulge documents relevant to
the nomination of William Rehnquist as Chief Justice,33 the ultimate remedy
would have been refusal to recommend or consider the nomination unless and
until the President divulged the materials. This is precisely what Senator Sam
Ervin did in 1973, when as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, he held hos-
tage the nomination of Richard Kliendienst as Attorney General until the Presi-
dent allowed Peter Flanagan, a White House assistant, to testify.34 These kinds
of separation of powers showdowns do not involve the judiciary and force the
political branches to resolve their differences or live with the consequences. It is
these kinds of resolutions that most accurately represent the "accommodation"
which is inherent in our system of divided powers.
Of course, the separation of powers is often used by the branches as a ra-
tionale to deal not with interbranch but intra-branch disputes. In the course of
litigating the legislative veto cases, there were significant elements within Con-
gress distrustful of the device, who actually looked longingly to the Court to
strike down the vetoes. Indeed a Rules Committee report issued in the middle of
litigation extolled the Solicitor General's position and triumphantly predicted a
Supreme Court decision striking down the legislative veto.35 Centers of power
within the legislative domain loved to brandish the veto but despised its decen-
tralizing impact on the real locus of activity in Congress-the committee system.
Such dissension in the congressional ranks could hardly go unnoticed in the
courts and may have had no demonstrable impact, but surely sent a conflicting
message on the unanimity of our position. This kind of intra-branch separation
problem is less likely in the unified and more centralized executive branch but it
certainly serves to emphasize the almost limitless possibilities of the doctrine.
The Iranian controversy provides, in my view, a fertile breeding ground for
cataclysmic separation of powers disputes. With the exception of the private
suits attacking the independent counsel statute initiated by Oliver North and
Michael Deaver, the battleground has been uncharacteristically quiet, no claims
of executive privilege and with the Tower Commission and the negotiated access
32. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 508 (Burger, C.L, dissenting).
33. E.g., Reagan Uses Executive Privilege To Keep Rehnquist Memos Secret, Wash. Post, Aug.
I, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
34. Note, Executive Privilege and the Congressional Right of Inquiry, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
621, 648-49 (1973).
35. H.R. REP. No. 97-809, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1982).
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by the congressional committees and the independent counsel to Presidential
diaries there appears little likelihood of any confrontation on that score. The
controversy does, however, forbode major disputes over the respective roles of
the President and Congress in covert activity with constitutional showdowns
likely over congressional review of so-called national security decisions reminis-
cent of the Church and Pike Committees in the early 1970s.
Despite the stridency and confusion spawned in the last decade over separa-
tion of powers, I believe the doctrine is alive and well, thriving in a manner the
Framers could not envision, but would surely approve.
In closing, I think it is well to remember that the doctrine of separation of
powers will, and should, be an evolving construct. Answers to questions posed
will come from political theory and policy considerations, as well as the text of
the Constitution itself.
I, for one, look forward to the battles that lie ahead in the war among the
branches.

